Charles Robert Bates v. Geneva Carol Bates : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1976
Charles Robert Bates v. Geneva Carol Bates : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
George H. Searle; Attorney for Appellant.
Jed W. Shields; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Bates v. Bates, No. 197614556.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1976).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/390
ScUMENT WM SUmMt W 
OOCHfTHO, /¥f*~i/{-
ME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
1
 4 JUN1977 
DRIGm Y0:'— SETY 
J. Rcd)ca C«.a *.- w«iool 
—oooOooo- -
CHARLES ROBERT BATES, 
P l a i n t i f f and 
re sponden t , 
-vs-
GENEVA CAROL BATES, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
CASE NO. 14556 
oooOooo-
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
oooOooo 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT AND FROM ORDER OF THE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Honorable BRYANT H. CROFT, Judge 
GEORGE H. SEARLE 
Attorney for Appellant 
2805 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
JED W. SHIELDS 
Attorney for Respondent 
243 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
F I L E D 
JUL 19 1976 
Cleric, Supreme Court, Utah 
TABLE OF CO>7TENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE Pgs . 1-2 
DISPOSITION OF LO^ER COURT P g s . 3 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL Page 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS PAGE 4 
ARGUMENT PGS 5-10 
CONCLUSION PGS10-12 
TABLE OF CONTENTS(CONTINUED) 
Cases Cited 
ANDERSON V. Anderson 
FOREMAN V. FOREMAN 
Mc Donald v. Mc Donald 
Pinion v. Pinion 
Wilson v Wilson 
Myers vs. Myers 
Marks v. Marks 
Openshaw v. Openshaw 
Larson vs. Larson 
Wallis vs. Wallis 
Smith vs. Bray 
Mc Kay vs. Mc Kay 
Scott vs. Scott 
Aldrich vs. Aldrich 
Cecil vs. Cecil 
Kent vs. Kent 
Ring vs. Ring 
Smith vs. Smith 
Stuber vs. Stuber 
Dearden vs. Dearden 
Peters vs Peters 
Sorensen vs Sorensen 
104 Ut 104 
111 Ut 72 
120 Ut 573 
92 Ut 255 
5 Ut2 79 
62 Ut 90 
98 Ut 400 
102 Ut 22 
9 Ut2 160 
2 
9 Ut 237 
11 Ut2 218 
13 Ut2 189 
19 Ut2 267 
119 Ut 504 
11 Ut2 155 
2 
28 Ut 34 
29 Ut2 436 
9 Ut2 157 
121 Ut 632 
15 Ut2 105 
15 Ut2 413 
20 Ut2 360 
Page 9 
Page 9 
Page 9 
Page 9 
Page 9 
Page 9 
Page 9 
Page 9 
page 9 
Page 9 
Page 9 
Page 9 
Page 9 
Page 9 
Page 9 
Page 9 
Page 9 
Page 9 
Page 9 
Page 10 
Page 10 
Page 10 
TABLE OF CONTENTS(CONTINUED) 
Cases Cited (Continued) 
Allen vs. Allen 25 Ut2 87 Page 
2 
King vs. King 25 Ut 163 Page 
Felt vs. Felt 27 Ut2 103 Page 
Anderson vv Anderson (1943) 104 Ut 104; 138 P2 252 Page 
STATUTES CITED 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proceedura Page 5 and 
IN THE SUPREME COURI OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
0 0 0 O 0 0 0 
CHARLES ROBERT BATES, 
P l a i n t i f f and 
Respondent , 
- v - s -
GENEVA CAROL BATES, 
Defendant and 
Appellant• 
Case Ho* 14556 
000O000 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
oooOooo— 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
oooOooo 
This action was commenced by an Order to Show Cause 
Proceeding whereby the ex-wife sought: 
1. A spelling out of child visitation rights, allowing 
the ex-wife to be relieved of a Court Order that she could 
not see any of the children, if just one of the children did-
not want to see^ or could not visit with her* (75,76, T-110) 
asking the Court to set certain times, places and conditions 
wherein she could maintain aid further a Mother-child relation-
ship with her children. (76) 
2. Payment of past due alimony owed to her in the amoun 
of $2,175, owed to the 15 day of February, 1976. (T-107) 
The ex-husband!s sole and only defense to non-payment 
was that his ex-wife had been honest enough to have informed 
him that she was going to be married, and if so^ he would 
not be obligated to pay further alimony, but 16 days later 
informed him that the contemplated marriage did not take place 
(81,82, T-112, T-113) 
The ex-husbandfs attorney admitted, "If she in fact has 
never remarried, then he does not dispute the alimony being 
owed". (T-107) 
The ex-tfife has not remarried, and was not re-married 
at the time of the hearing. 
At no time prior to the Court action was a hearing 
brought, or Motion made, to suspend alimony payments. (T-122) 
and it is submitted no material circumstances were proven 
sufficient, for the Court, without warning, to suspend alimon 
and visitations rights vested in the Mother. 
The ex-wife, in answer to questions put by Counsel 
to her, and Cross-examination by the Court, testified: 
-2-
1. That she had not remarried. (T-108 and 109) 
2. That she moved from Little America, Wyoming, to 
Idaho because her ex-husband, as a truck driver, harrassed 
and tried to get her fired. (T-110 and 111) 
3. That she resides in a separate side of a house, 
with separate entrance, bathroom and bedroom.(T-lll, 112,114)• 
4. That she did not share her bedroom with anyone. 
(T-lll, 112), and had paid some rent. (T-112) 
5. That she was medically hurt, and financially in 
bad shape, (T-121) 
6. That she was not on welfare. (T-121) 
From the foregoing facts, not rebutted, the Court, 
at (T-122) says: "Now, when you can show me she is living 
under cicrumstances that the children ought to visit her, 
and she is not living, I think, in violation of the law 
with a man she is not married to—we are not talking about 
whether they sleep together or having sexual intercourse 
or anything of the kind, We don't need to prove or disprove 
that". (T-122, 123) 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
The Court, on it's own volition, relieved the ex-
husband of any responsibility for paying alimony to his ex-
-3-
wife and denied the ex-wife visitation with the children on 
Mother's Day, and reserved further visitation by the Mother 
with the children for the Court to consider in months ahead. 
(-122,123, 124,125) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Setting aside the trial Court's Order, dated the 
15 March, 1976, and making such other and further Order 
as the Court deems just and equitable under the facts of 
this case, awarding the Appellant judgment for alimony due 
and owing, allowing her to see her children, and the relief 
prayed for in the Order To Show Cause, dated the 23 January 
1976- (77, 78) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1: The decision of the Court and judgment entered 
is not supported by the evidence, by Findings of Fact or 
Conclusions of Law. 
POINT 2: The decision made modifying the Divorce Decree 
was not properly, or timely, before the Court. 
POINT 3: The decision made by the Court denying the Appella 
past and future alimony and child visitation rights is not 
supported by the evidence, and is also contrary to Utah 
Law, the evidence, the past decisions of the Utah Supreme 
-4-
Court and Equity. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT 1: The decision of the Court and Judgment entered, 
was not supported by the evidence, by Findings of Facts, 
or Conclusions of Law. 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure provide 
that in all actions tried upon facts the Court shall find 
the facts specially and state separately its Conclusions 
of Law thereon, and direct the entry of the appropriate 
Judgment. 
The Trial Court found only a finding that the Appellant 
had been residing with a man in the State of Idaho for a 
period of approximately one (1) year, and that the Appellant 
had advised the Court she was not ready to get married at 
this time. (85) 
The Court made no conclusions that the Appellant did 
anything unlawful, did anything immoral or unfit. In fact 
the Court makes no other Finding of Fact* makes no Conclusions 
of Law whatsoever, summarily on its own does deny Appellant 
alimony past due and vested, as well as terminating future 
alimony and child visitation rights previously allowed the 
Appellant. In coming to the foregoing decision the Court 
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accuses the Appellant of living in violation of the law(T-122) 
and at the same time admitting that the Court was not !ltalking 
about whether they sleep together or having sexual inter-
course, or anything of the kind. Ue don't need to prove 
or disprove that11. (T-122, 123). It is submitted that there 
must be something proven beyond what the Court acted on in 
this case before the Appellant should forfiet her right to 
see her children and receive her alimony. I assume that if 
a woman who vzas divorced rented a spare bedroom to a man rent 
the Courts decision would have been the same. To modify a 
Divorce Decree as the trial Court has done in this case, ther 
must be a substantial change jof circumstances found that will 
justify the modification,and the Order of Judgment signed 
by the Court on the 15 day of March, 1976, does not find 
as a finding such to be the case, makes no Conclusions of 
Law, but does enter Judgment herein appealed from. When the 
Appellant was granted alimony and child visitation rights, 
I do not believe that the Trial Court made as a condition 
precedant to receiving such rights that the Appellant could 
not reside in a home wherein another human being resided, 
in this case a man, especially when the facts are that she 
had her own bedroom, own bathroom, was injured, did not 
-6-
seek welfare, and was not sleeping with the other occupant 
of the house. I do not believe that the law in Utah has gone 
so far as to say that if a divorced woman so nuch as resides 
in a boarding house with another human being or should, so 
as to not take welfare, should rent a room or even take 
in boarders she would forfiet child visitation rights as 
well as the great sum of $150 a month alimony from a man 
who earned at time of trial the sum of $19,000 a year.(36), 
and for whom she gave birth to four (4) children. (8, 14) 
POINT 2: The decision made modifying the Divorce Decree 
was not properly or timely before the Court. 
An examination of the Court record will show that the 
only matter before the Court was the Appellants Order to 
Show Cause Proceeding, dated the 23 day of January, 1976.(77 
Further, the Respondent Mr. Bates never did testify 
or give evidence. 
However, Respondent did, by his counsel admit that 
11If she, in fact, has never remmarried, then he does not 
dispute the alimony being owedTt. (T-107) 
Counsel for Appellant pointed out to the Court, lfas 
far as I know at this time, I don't think this hearing was 
brought or no motion has been made to suspend the alimony 
payments." 
-7-
The Court5 on its own, without regard to the Appellants 
vested right to have judgment for accrued and owing alimony, 
without allowing counsel time to prepare therefore, did in 
effect restrain the Appellant from seeing her children, and 
did in effect say, ugo on welfare to live", because for nearly 
a year she had received no help from the man she gave four (4) 
children. This without even questioning the Respondent about 
not paying alimony or his actions in denying the Appellant 
rights of visitation, or AppellantTs dire financial circum-
stances, or condition when not receiving alimony from the 
Respondent• 
POINT 3: The decision made by the Court denying the Appellant 
past and future alimony and child visitation rights is not 
supported by the evidence, and is also contrary to Utah Law, 
the evidence, the past decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, 
and Equity. 
In support of the above point 3, as well as Points 
1 and 2, the following Utah Cases are cited: 
A. Alimony Elements(What the Trial Court considers wt 
granting alimony, and what might be considered a mate} 
change thereof to justify modification or termination' 
-8-
ANDERSON V. ANDERSON 104Ut 104 
FOREMAN V FORMAN HlUt72 
MCDONALD V MC DONALD I20ut573 
PINION VS PINION 92Ufc255 
WILSON V WILSON 5Ut279 
B. Past due alimony is a vested right and judgment 
should be awarded therefore. 
MYERS VS MYERS 62Ut90 
MARKS V MARKS 98Ut400 
OPENSHAW V OPENSHAW 102Ut22 
2 
LARSON V LARSON 9Ut 160 
WALLIS V WALLIS 9Ut2 237 
SMITH V.BRAY llUt2 218 
McKay v McKAY 13Ut2 189 
SCOTT V SCOTT 19Ut2 267 
C. Right of alimony not destroyed by wrong doing. 
ALDRICH V ALDRICH 119 Ut 504 
CECIL V. CECIL 11 Ut2 155 
2 
KENT y KENT 28 Ut 34 
RING V RING 29Ut2 436 
D. Right to visitation not destroyed by wrong doing, 
SMITH V SMITH 9 Ut2 157 
STUBER V STUBER 121 Ut 632 
-9-
DEARDEN V DEARDEN 15 Ut2 105 
E. MODIFICATION RESULT OF MATERIAL CHANGE OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
PETERS V PETERS 15 Ut2 413 
SORENSEN V SORENSEN 20 Ut2 360 
ALLEN V ALLEN 25 Ut2 87 
KING V KING 25 Ut2 163 
FELT V FELT 27 Ut2 103 
F. Modification or Restraing Order need Finding of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law to support Judgment. 
Rule 52 Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant feels that the Court records do not justify 
the Order made by the Trial Court on the 20 dayof February, 
1976 (85,86), and the testimony elicited by the Court on its 
own behalf to satisfy its own personal beliefs without suf-
ficient facts of material wrong doing on the part of the 
Appellant does not justify the said Order made on the 20 Feb 
ruary,1976. To hold as the Trial Court here held that a 
woman should be deprived of the small amount of $150 a month 
alimony after years of duty as a wife and mother of four(4) 
children, from a husband who earns $19,000 a year is not eqi. 
Especially in the absence of sex, wrong doing or unlawful 
-10-
acts on the part of Appellant• To justify the Trial Court's 
reasoning in this case is to open "Pandora's Box11 to attack 
and excuse the obligation to pay alimony, and to deny a 
woman the right to visit with her children if she should 
be purchased a meal by a man, or even if she resided in the 
same building or hotel wheae a man friend may reside. Lastly, 
the acts which the Trial Court acted upon were not fairly 
before the Court, were not brought before the Court by 
either the Appellant or the Respondent, and if either of 
the parties had attempted, on their own, to bring the matters 
adjudicated by the Court against the Courts wishes, the 
Court would have certainly stopped the same, except in this 
case the Court did not act as judge, but prosecutor as well. 
Perhaps our Court system has come to this, and if it has, 
sooner or later the innocent and family's involved by such 
actions of the Court in the hands of such a judge, will do 
more harm than can be inflicted upon the Appellant in this action* 
Further, I cannot help but wonder if the Trial Judge 
would have come to the same decisions made in this case if 
the Appellant had been re siding, under the same facts*, with 
a woman instead of a man. No sleeping together or sex being 
involved as the testimony in this case discloses, and the 
-11-
trial Judge admits. (T-122, 123). Perhaps then a finding 
of fact could be found that she was "Queer1*, and a Conclusion 
made that she would be an unfit mother to visit with* 
Hardly, however, that she would have to forfiet past due and 
future alimony of $150 a month from a man earning $19,000 a 
year. 
Lastly, I believe this Court put it and called it as 
it should be in the case of Anderson v Andeirson (1943) 104 Ul 
104; 138 ? 252. "Basis for allowance of "alimony" to wife 
is to repay wife for years spent in caring for household 
and helping husband in building up husbands property, and 
to enable wife to live, or to recompense wife as far as 
material recompense will do so, for injuries or abuse to 
wife's person or impairment of wifefs health brought on by 
husband's conduct during coverture". 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
Thlss?J?7% day of July, 19 
eorge'^ ir S^arle 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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